In e-marketplaces with limited inventory where buyers' demand is larger than sellers' supply, promoting honesty raises new challenges: sellers may behave dishonestly because they can sell out all products without the necessity of gaining high reputation; buyers may provide untruthful ratings to mislead other buyers in order to have a higher chance to obtain the limited products. In this paper, we propose a novel incentive mechanism to promote honesty in such e-marketplaces. More specifically, our mechanism models both buyer and seller honesty. It offers higher prices to the products provided by honest sellers so that the sellers can gain more profit. Honest buyers also have a higher chance to do business with honest sellers and are able to gain more utility. Theoretical analysis and experimental results show that our mechanism promotes both buyer and seller honesty. Finally, we address the re-entry problem by imposing membership fees on new sellers. We show that the membership fee can discourage sellers from re-entry both in theoretical analysis and experimental validation.
INTRODUCTION
In electronic marketplaces, buyers and sellers come together through the electronic media, such as the Internet, to conduct transactions. Along with the convenience emarketplaces bring, lack of trust and reliability has been frequently cited to be one of the key factors that discourage buyers from participating in the e-marketplaces. A reputation system, which predicts sellers' behavior based on ratings given by buyers, is an effective way to help buyers to select reliable sellers [7, 9] . It also creates incentives for sellers to behave honestly in order to be chosen as business partners by many buyers. However, in reputation systems, buyers may provide untruthful ratings to promote some sellers or drive Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. ICEC'12 August 07 -08 2012, Singapore, Singapore Copyright 2012 ACM 978-1-4503-1197-7/12/08 ...$10.00. some other sellers out of the market. To address this problem, incentive mechanisms, e.g. [4, 10] , have been designed to supplement reputation systems, by creating incentives for buyers to provide truthful ratings.
One common but perhaps implicit assumption in these incentive mechanisms and reputation systems is that sellers can provide a large number of products in e-marketplaces. However, in the real world, e-marketplaces with limited inventory exist in many scenarios. For example, dentist booking in US, as a marketplace, has been observed the phenomenon that the service demand is much larger than the service supply [2] . Another example is the hotel booking system for a famous tourism area during a peak season since booking a satisfactory hotel is often difficult. Similar marketplaces also include second-hand markets where some used and workable goods (e.g. second-hand textbooks) are often in short supply due to lower prices. We call a marketplace in which the demand outweighs the supply a marketplace with limited inventory.
New challenges are imposed on promoting buyer and seller honesty in e-marketplaces with limited inventory. Sellers with limited inventory, given that other sellers also hold limited inventory compared to buyer demand, may behave maliciously in their transactions, by not delivering promised products or reducing the quality of delivered products. Even though their reputation would decrease due to the negative ratings from the buyers cheated by them, the sellers may still be willing to increase their profit by sacrificing reputation, because they may not have as a strong desire to maintain a very high reputation as in the marketplace where the supply outweighs the demand. Therefore, in the e-marketplaces with limited inventory, reputation itself cannot give sellers enough incentives to behave honestly. Buyers may also have incentives to report dishonest ratings. After a successful transaction with a seller, the buyer knows that the seller is a good seller. If the buyer provides a truthful (positive) rating about the seller, then the buyer reduces her/his own opportunity of doing business with the seller in the future, due to the limited inventory that the seller has. If the transaction is unsuccessful, reporting a truthful (negative) rating also reduces the buyer opportunity of doing business with other good sellers because other buyers will be less likely to do business with the bad seller but with the other good sellers, after taking the buyer's advice. Thus, buyers may lose some profit because of providing truthful ratings. In other words, in e-marketplaces with limited inventory, providing truthful ratings is costly. The existing incentive mechanisms seldom consider these costs imposed on providing truthful ratings.
In this paper, we propose an incentive mechanism to promote buyer and seller honesty in e-marketplaces with limited inventory. It overcomes the challenges discussed above. In our mechanism, buyer honesty is measured by a normalized proper scoring rule which will be discussed later, where a buyer can and only can gain maximal scores by providing truthful ratings. The higher score brings the buyer larger utility. Seller honesty is measured by the ratings provided by buyers (weighted based on the buyers' scores) so that honest sellers are able to gain high reputation. The products of sellers with higher reputation are offered with a higher price. On the other hand, buyers with higher scores have more opportunities to conduct transactions with more reputable sellers. Theoretical analysis proves that our mechanism can induces honesty from both buyers and sellers. We also discuss how our mechanism addresses the issue of reentry where buyers or sellers leave and re-register as new participants. Finally, we conduct experiments to validate the theoretical results.
RELATED WORK
Reputation systems are prevalently used in e-marketplaces, and can effectively assist buyers to select good sellers by predicting sellers' future behavior based on ratings shared by buyers [9, 7] . In a reputation system, a seller with good reputation would gain more profit through the increased amount of transactions with buyers, because more buyers are attracted to do transactions with the seller. Therefore, reputation systems create incentives for sellers to behave honestly in order to be chosen by buyers. However, in reputation systems, buyers may provide untruthful ratings to promote some sellers or drive some other sellers out of the market. In [5] , a reputation mechanism with a controller agent as the reputation manager is proposed to detect fake positive ratings from collusive or dishonest buyers.
Different incentive mechanisms have also been proposed to elicit truthful ratings from buyers. For example, the sidepayment mechanism [4] rewards buyers who have provided ratings some amount of side payment. Buyers who provide truthful ratings can gain maximal side payment, which creates incentives for buyers to rate truthfully. In the trustbased incentive mechanism [10] , sellers prefer to provide more attractive products to honest buyers, because honest buyers are likely to be advisors of many other buyers, which helps the sellers attract more potential buyers.
In these reputation systems and incentive mechanisms, there is an implicit assumption that sellers have a large number of products to sell, In e-marketplaces with limited inventory, because sellers do not have many products to sell, the only way that a seller increases his profit is to gain a higher price for his products, rather than increases the amount of sales.
For marketplaces with limited inventory, in the work of [8] , a dynamic pricing agent is designed to increase product prices when sellers have limited inventory, following the low of supply and demand in economic theory. Their purpose is to maximize the utility of sellers. In contrast, in our work, we increase product prices to create incentives for sellers to be honest. In our mechanism, honest sellers are offered higher prices for their products than dishonest sellers. This idea of the price premium is well supported by economics studies. Empirical evidence reveals that prices of products sold by honest sellers are generally higher [6] . Buyers' purchase intention would not be affected by the price premium provided to honest sellers [1] .
OUR INCENTIVE MECHANISM
The electronic marketplace employing our mechanism runs periodically. During each transaction period, each seller can only sell one product and each buyer can only buy one product. In the beginning of each transaction period, sellers post the products they want to sell and buyers post buying requests specifying the products they want to buy. The emarketplace center gathers together the sellers who sell the same kind of products and the buyers who want to buy those products. It is assumed that in each transaction period, buyers' demand of the products is larger than sellers' supply of those products, meaning that the e-marketplace has limited inventory, and thus some buyers will not be able to gain the products that they want to buy. For the same products, their prices will then be determined by the e-marketplace center and these products will be allocated to some buyers. After each transaction, the buyer can provide a rating in [0, 1] for the seller from whom the buyer receives the product, reflecting the buyer's satisfaction about the transaction, i.e. the ratio of the quality of the received product to that of the product promised by the seller.
As the central component of the e-marketplace, our incentive mechanism is composed of a normalized proper scoring rule, a reputation model, a pricing algorithm, and an allocation algorithm. More specifically, in our incentive mechanism, we measure buyer honesty by a score and seller honesty by the reputation, which are updated after each transaction period. Buyer score will be updated after the buyer submits a rating, according to the normalized proper scoring rule. The normalized proper scoring rule makes sure that truthful ratings provided by buyers are awarded maximum expected scores. Seller reputation is calculated by the reputation model which aggregates ratings of the seller provided by buyers. The pricing algorithm sets higher prices for the products provided by sellers with higher reputation. The allocation algorithm ranks buyers according to their scores, and allocates products of honest sellers to buyers with highest scores. As a result, sellers prefer to behave honestly in delivering promised products to achieve higher prices for their products, buyers intend to provide honest ratings in order to receive products from honest sellers, and honest sellers and honest buyers are able to gain larger utility. Therefore, our incentive mechanism promotes honesty from both buyers and sellers.
Modeling Buyer Honesty
In this section, we provide a class of normalized proper scoring rules to measure buyer honesty, where buyers providing truthful ratings about sellers will be able to gain the maximal scores.
Given a binary event with two outcomes e and e ′ , p is the actual probability of e and the actual probability of e ′ is 1 − p. Let x be a predicted probability of e. If the outcome of the event is e, then the agent having predicted the probability as x will be rewarded the scores S(x), whereas if the outcome is e ′ , the agent will be rewarded S(1 − x) scores. The expected amount of the rewarded scores is E(S, x, p) = pS(x) + (1 − p)S(1 − x). The scoring function S(x) is a proper scoring rule, if and only if E(S, p, p) ≥ E(S, x, p) and the equality is true only when x = p [3] . Based on the concept of proper scoring rules, we extend them to be normalized proper scoring rules. The reason why proper scoring rules cannot be directly used in our mechanism is that we aim to use scores to measure buyer honesty which should be comparable, even when the scores are gained from transactions with sellers having different honesty levels in delivering promised product.
.
From Definition 1, normalized proper scoring rules are bounded in [0, 1] . It is also essential that they have the same properties of the proper scoring rules, that is E(S ′ , p, p) ≥ E(S ′ , x, p), and equality is true only when x = p.
In order to further explain the definition, we give an example here. Suppose that a buyer is going to predict the honesty of one seller in delivering promised products. We can adopt a quadratic scoring rule S(x) = −2x 2 + 4x − 1 [3] , and calculate the maximal and minimal expected scores as M ax(p) = 2p 2 −2p+1 and M in(p) = min{1−2p, 2p−1}. According to Definition 1, the normalized proper scoring rule is:
In our mechanism, the honesty of a seller s in delivering promised products is modeled by the seller's reputation Rs, which will be introduced in detail in the next section. Thus, the probability of s being dishonest is 1 − Rs. In the end of the current transaction period t, a buyer b involved in the transaction with seller s can provide a rating indicating the buyer's satisfaction about the transaction. Once the rating is given, the buyer's score towards seller s will be updated, according to Eq. (2). In consequence, the buyer's overall scores towards all sellers will also be updated.
More formally, we first calculate the expectation value (denoted as r s b (t)) of the distribution of the ratings provided by a buyer b towards a seller s until the current transaction period t. The buyer b's scores towards seller s can then be measured as:
′ is a normalized proper scoring rule, and Rs(t − 1) is the reputation of seller s up to the previous transaction period. We also count the total number of ratings given by b towards s, denoted as N s b (t). By weighted average of the scores towards different sellers, the buyer b's overall score is:
where S is the set of sellers whom the buyer b has done transactions with before and provided ratings for.
Proposition 1. Given a seller s whose reputation is Rs(t− 1) up to the previous transaction period, a buyer b who buys products from s can achieve the maximal amount of scores by providing truthful ratings, if (1) S ′ is a normalized proper scoring rule and (2) Rs(t − 1) truly reflects the honesty of s in delivering promised products.
See the proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix A.1.
Modeling Seller Honesty
The honesty of a seller s is modeled by aggregating the ratings provided by buyers (who have conducted transactions with s), considering the buyers' honesty in providing them. More formally, in the end of the transaction period t, given the expected value of the distribution of a buyer b's ratings r 
where B is the set of buyers whom the seller s has done transactions with before and received ratings from, and Rs(t − 1) is seller reputation in the end of the previous transaction period t − 1. F is a reputation model which can truly measure seller honesty in delivering promised products. In this paper, we do not specify the form of F, since it is application dependent and many reputation modeling approaches have already been proposed in literature, such as [7, 9] .
Pricing and Allocating Products
In this section, we introduce the proposed pricing algorithm and allocation algorithm in our mechanism to determine the prices for the products provided by sellers and then allocate the limited products to some of the buyers. For the purpose of simplicity, we focus on one kind of products 1 , and assume that buyers' valuation of the products follows some distribution in the interval [V * , V * ] where V * and V * are the maximal and minimal valuation of buyers towards the products provided by sellers, respectively. We also assume that sellers have the same cost C of producing that same kind of products with the promised quality, and V * > C, to make sure that the products are worthy of being produced.
As we analyzed in Section 1, sellers in e-marketplaces with limited inventory generally lack of the incentive to behave honestly even with reputation mechanisms employed, because reputation information about sellers cannot impose competition among sellers in such markets. Sellers with relatively low reputation can still have the chance to do business with buyers because of the limited available products in the markets. The consequence is that sellers will decrease the quality of their delivered products (also reputation) to the point where buyers' utility is minimized (i.e. approaches 0) and at the same time maximize their own profit. In our mechanism, the pricing algorithm associates sellers' profit with their behavior. More specifically, it offers higher prices to products of sellers with higher reputation. In this way, it creates incentives for sellers to behave honestly. At the same time, the pricing algorithm makes sure that buyers can gain positive utility.
In our pricing algorithm, product prices are determined by a pricing function P(Rs), where Rs is seller reputation modeled by Eq. (4). The pricing function should satisfy some basic requirements: (1) P(Rs) > 0 for Rs ∈ (0, 1]; (2) P(0) = 0; (3) P(δ) = C; (4) (1) ensures that the price set for seller with positive reputation is larger than 0. In the extreme case where sellers never deliver products at all, the price for the sellers' products should be set 0 as in requirement (2).
In
ing promised products. Since P(0) = 0 and P(δ) = C, there should exist a reputation value R0 so that P(R0) = R0 × C as in requirement (5), according to the continuity property of the pricing function P(Rs). Thus, when a seller's reputation Rs = R0, the seller's profit would be P(R0) − R0C = 0. In other words, R0 is the minimum reputation that sellers can gain non-negative profit. Sellers with reputation lower than R0 will not be profitable. The purpose is to disappoint those sellers who intend to take advantages of the limited inventory situation by behaving dishonestly. By setting the lowest profitable reputation R0, sellers with reputation lower than R0 will generally leave the market.
To (3) and (5), we can derive a =
. According to requirement (4), we can also derive that 2aRs + b > 0, which can be satisfied by setting the constraint δ ≥ √ R0. The pseudo code summary of the pricing algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1:
The Pricing Algorithm Input : S, a set of sellers offering the products; Rs, reputation of a seller s ∈ S before the current transaction period; C, δ, R0, which are introduced above; Output : P , the price for a seller's product;
In addition, our pricing algorithm has two nice properties. The first property is that buyers' utility is positive when R0 and δ are set properly, ensuring that the buyers allocated with products of sellers will be willing to carry out the transactions with the sellers (see Proposition 2 in the next section). The second property is that buyers allocated products from sellers with higher reputation will be able to gain larger utility even though the prices of these products are higher. Therefore, buyers are willing to buy products from sellers with higher reputation (see Proposition 2). Due to the first property and the fact that not all buyers can be allocated with products (limited inventory), our allocation algorithm ensures that honest buyers (i.e. buyers with larger scores) will have higher probabilities of being allocated with products. Due to the second property, we make sure that honest buyers will also likely be allocated with products provided by sellers with higher reputation, so that honest buyers will be able to gain more profit. These create incentives for buyers to behave honestly by providing truthful ratings.
Following the two properties of the pricing algorithm, we come up with the allocation algorithm whose pseudo code summary is shown in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: The Allocation Algorithm Input : B, buyers who want to buy products; S, sellers offering the products; η, the exploration factor; Output : Allocation of products to buyers;
1 Sr ← Randomly choose η percentage of S (products); 2 Sg ← The rest 1 − η percentage of S (products); 3 Sort Sg based on seller reputation in descending order; 4 Sort B based on buyer scores in descending order; 5 foreach s ∈ Sg do 6 Allocate product of s to ranked top buyer b ∈ B; 7 Remove b from B; 8 end 9 foreach s ∈ Sr do 10 Allocate product of s to random buyer b ∈ B; 11 Remove b from B; 12 end More specifically, the algorithm sets an exploration factor η ∈ [0, 1]. The η percentage of randomly selected products among all available products will be randomly allocated to some buyers (excluding the most honest buyers with the largest scores who will be allocated with another 1 − η percentage of products) (see Lines 9-12 in Algorithm 2). This is to make sure that new buyers will also have a fair chance to do business with sellers and later provide truthful ratings to gain scores. The η factor is set relatively high in the beginning of the operation of an e-marketplace when a large number of new buyers join the market, but will be decreased when the market becomes more mature and stable and not many new buyers will join the market. Another 1 − η percentage of all available products will be allocated to the most honest buyers (i.e. the buyers with the largest scores). To be specific, these products are sorted according to their sellers' reputation in a descending order. The buyers are also ranked in a descending order according to their scores. The products are then allocated to the buyers one by one according to the descending order, so that the products of sellers with higher reputation are allocated to the buyers with larger scores (see Lines 5-8 in Algorithm 2). Note that each buyer is allocated with one product in each transaction period.
ANALYSIS OF INCENTIVES
According to the proposed model, the profit of a seller s in a transaction period can be described as:
where Ps is the price of the product provided by seller s determined by Algorithm 1 and C is the cost for s in producing the promised product. A buyer b's utility of carrying out a transaction with seller s can be formalized as follows:
where V s b is buyer b's valuation for the product of seller s.
Promoting Buyer Honesty
Given buyer utility function U ′ , we analyze buyer behavior and prove that buyers are better off to behave honestly. Proposition 2. The utility of a buyer is positive from conducting a transaction with a seller s having Rs > R0,
}, meanwhile, the buyer utility increases as the seller reputation increases.
See the proof of Proposition 2 in Appendix A.2.
Proposition 3. The utility of a buyer who provides truthful ratings is no less than that of a buyer who provides untruthful ratings.
See the proof of Proposition 3 in Appendix A.3.
Therefore, from the perspective of buyers, they can obtain more utility from transactions with sellers with higher reputation, and meanwhile, they prefer to provide truthful ratings rather than untruthful ratings to achieve the larger utility. Our mechanism promotes buyer honesty in providing ratings.
Promoting Seller Honesty
In this section, we analyze sellers' profit and behavior on delivering products, and show that sellers have the incentive to be honest. Therefore, from the perspective of sellers, they are profitable by honestly delivering the promised products and building up their reputation to be higher than R0. Rational sellers will not let their reputation become lower than R0 because otherwise their utility will be negative. In a word, our mechanism promotes seller honesty in delivering products.
INITIALIZATION AND RE-ENTRY
In this section, we discuss how to set initial reputation values and scores for new sellers and buyers, and at the same time to avoid the re-entry issue where buyers and sellers with low scores and low reputation values leave the marketplace and re-register as new buyers and sellers, respectively.
For a new seller, the system has no information about the seller's honesty, and initializing the reputation for the seller is tricky. If the initial reputation is set too high, existing sellers with lower reputation values will prefer to leave the market and re-register as new sellers. On the other hand, if the initial reputation is set too low (e.g. lower than R0), new honest sellers will be discouraged to participate into the system because their initial profit is negative according to the pricing function P(Rs). In our mechanism, we set the initial seller reputation as δ. New honest sellers will gain zero profit in their first transactions. If they act honestly in their transactions, then they will be able to gain positive profit in the future transactions. However, existing sellers with reputation lower than δ may leave and re-enter the market. To prevent this re-entry problem, we impose some amount of membership fee M = N0(M1 + M2) = N0C to new sellers, where M1 = (1 − R0)C, M2 = R0C, and N0 is the minimum number of transactions conducted by sellers that the system can accurately model the sellers' reputation (within a certain accuracy). The value of N0 can be determined by the Chernoff Bound Theorem [7] . When sellers decide to leave the market, the amount Mr will be returned back to the sellers, which is:
If a seller s whose actual reputation Rs ∈ (R0, δ) performs re-entry, reputation of s is initialized to δ at the cost of M − Mr. The profit of s in the first N0 transactions after re-entry is
If the seller s stays in the market, the profit gained in the N0 transactions would be
That means that sellers with reputation Rs ∈ (R0, δ) will gain smaller profit by re-entering. When Rs < R0, N 0 t=1 Ur(Rs(t)) < N0(−RsC) ≤ 0. Sellers with reputation Rs < R0 cannot gain positive utility by re-entry. Thus, with the properly determined membership fee, sellers do not have the incentive to re-enter the market.
For new buyers, we initialize their scores as zero. They still have the opportunity to be allocated with products because our allocation algorithm (Algorithm 2) randomly allocates a η percentage of products to buyers. Since the scores assigned to buyers are non-negative (see Eq. (5)), any buyers who still want to buy products would never be willing to whitewash their scores by re-entry.
EXPERIMENTAL VALIDATION
In this section, we carry out a set of experiments to evaluate our incentive mechanism. We conduct experiments in both static and dynamic settings. In the static setting, there is no new seller or new buyer participate the marketplace during the experiment. While in the dynamic setting, some new sellers and buyers join the marketplace periodically. In addition, we show that our mechanism discourages sellers from re-entry, by initializing the reputation of a new seller as δ and applying the membership fee discussed in Section 5.
We simulate an e-marketplace environment involving sellers and buyers conducting transactions about the same products. The total number of products provided by the sellers is less than that of the buyers' demand, i.e. a market with the limited inventory. We set R0 = 0.6, δ = 0.85 (satisfying Proposition 2), the cost in producing promised quality product C = 1, the minimal valuation of buyers towards the product V * = 2, the maximal valuation of buyers towards the product V * = 2.5, allocation exploration factor η = 0.1, and reputation learning rate α = 0.5. A set of simulations with variant settings have been experimented, and the results are similar. Because of space limitation, we only show the results of one specific setting as described above.
In our simulation, if a seller behaves honestly in one transaction, the seller would deliver a quality product. Otherwise, the seller delivers a product with 50% quality. In order to
who deliver products with 50% quality and 0.5 for those who have delivered quality products.
Static Experimental Results
In the static setting, we show that the proposed incentive mechanism can promote honesty from both buyers and sellers. In the beginning of our simulation, we bootstrap our system by only allowing 80 honest buyers and 40 sellers to conduct transactions in the first 1000 transactions, and the results are shown in Figure 1 .
In Figure 1 . We observe that seller reputation reflects their probability of honest delivery in Figure 1(a) . Seller average profit in selling one product also follows the same trend with the probability of honest delivery as shown in Figure 1(b) . During the bootstrapping stage, all sellers are assigned relatively accurate reputation, and sellers with higher reputations can gain more profit in selling products.
After the bootstrapping, we run another 9000 transaction periods, where another 320 buyers who provide truthful ratings in different probabilities are considered in the static setting. Figures 2 and 3 show our static experimental results.
In Figure 2 , we show how seller reputation and profit changes with respect to their probability in delivering quality products. We observe in Figure 2 (a) that seller reputation follows the same trend as the probability of honest delivery. But it is slightly influenced by dishonest ratings compared with that during the bootstrapping stage. The average profit in selling one product also follows the same trend. The higher probability that a seller honestly delivers products, the higher average profit that the seller earns, which is shown in Figure 2 (b). The Figure 2 shows that sellers have the incentive to deliver quality products. In Figure 3 , we show the relationships between the buyer scores, total utility and the probability of honest ratings. We observe that the expected buyer score decreases as the buyer probability of honest ratings reduces as shown in 3(a). In addition, the fluctuation of the score increases, because buyers with lower scores have less opportunities to be allocated products of honest sellers. In Figure 3(b) , we observe that the total utility of a honest buyer is larger than a dishonest buyer. Many dishonest buyers cannot gain much utility because they do not have any chance to do business with sellers, according to our allocation algorithm (Algorithm 2). 
Dynamic Experimental Results
In the dynamic setting, we allow new buyers and sellers join the marketplace during the simulation. In order to maintain our system being a e-marketplace with limited inventory, we allow 1 new new seller and 10 new buyers to participate into our system at the same time. After the bootstrapping stage, we let 5 new sellers and 50 new buyers (buyer honesty follows the same distribution with the existing 400 buyers) participate into the system in every 100 transaction periods. After 400 transaction periods, 20 new sellers (seller reputation follows the same distribution with the existing 80 sellers) and 200 new buyers participate into our system. After such a dynamic process, we simulate another 1000 transaction periods in the static setting to observe seller profit and reputation. We obtain the results as shown in Figure 4 and Figure 5 . Figure 4 shows seller reputation and profit in selling one product (60 sellers in total). We observe that new honest sellers still gain the same reputation and profit as the honest sellers who previously exist in the system. These results are shown in Figures 4(a) and 4(b) , respectively. It means that honest sellers can always gain higher reputation and more profit no matter when they join our e-marketplace. In addition, more honest buyers gain higher scores and more utility, which are shown in Figures 5(a) and 5(b) . Therefore the in- centives of buyers and sellers in behaving honestly are still maintained when new sellers and buyers dynamically join into our e-marketplace. To conclude, our incentive mechanism ensures the sustainability of the e-marketplace by allowing new sellers and new buyers to participate into our e-marketplace, and our mechanism still works well in such a dynamic environment.
Re-entry Scenario
In this experiment, we show how membership fee discourages sellers from re-entry. We simulate the total profit of three sellers s1, s2 and s3 with actual reputation R1 = 1, R2 = 0.7 and R3 = 0.55, respectively. We simulation 10 times and show the average results in Figure 6 . Figure 6 : Re-entry scenario: (a) sellers total profit without re-entry and without membership fee, (b) sellers total profit with re-entry but without membership fee, (c) sellers total profit with re-entry and with membership fee
In Figure 6 (a), we observe that s1 gains positive profit. The s2 also gains positive profit which is less than that of s1, and s3 gains negative profit. It shows that sellers with reputation less than R0 = 0.5 has the incentive to leave the marketplace due to the negative profit. In Figure 6 (b), we simulate how the mechanism performs without membership fee. We find that sellers s2 and s3, whose reputation is less than initial reputation δ = 0.85, have the incentive to exit and re-participate again to gain temporarily higher profit. When membership fee is applied, as shown in Figure 6 (c), all the three sellers would gain less profit if they leave and re-enter the marketplace, by comparing with Figure 6 (a). Thus, with the membership fee, sellers do not have the incentive for re-entry.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed an incentive mechanism to promote buyer and seller honesty in e-marketplaces with limited inventory. More specifically, our mechanism models both buyer and seller honesty. A pricing algorithm is proposed to set high prices for products provided by honest sellers. In this way, sellers are incentivized to be honest. An allocation algorithm is proposed to allocate quality products to honest buyers, where the honest buyers will gain larger utility. Because of limited inventory, dishonest buyers may not be allocated any product. In this way, buyers are incentivized to be honest.
We analyze the proposed incentive mechanism in two perspectives, both theoretical proofs and experimental validation. Therefore, we confirm that the proposed incentive mechanism can promote buyer and seller honesty in the emarketplaces with limited inventory.
